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by Stanley Brice Frost 
James McGill was a man of many careers - courageous fur trader, s u c c e s ~ l  Montreal merchant, conscientious 
city magistrate, influential member of the Legislative Assembly, senior member of the Governor's Executive Council, 
andfinally Colonel and Acting Brigadier-General of Militia. Yet after his death, this outstanding personality quickly 
lapsed into obscurity. Except for having bequeathed land and endowment for a college, James McGill was 
forgotten. In the late 1920s, Maysie Steele MacSporran essayed a thesis-biography, but since it was never published 
her work remained largely unnoticed. In the 1980s S.B. Frost devoted the first chapter of his history of McGill 
University to its founder and John Cooper wrote a comprehensive entry in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 
Meanwhile, Lawrence Lunde had gathered into his Canadians collections valuable papers relating to McGill and 
his times, and the University's Rare Book Collections had acquired some survivors of his financial papers and 
correspondence. Tke McCord Museum also possesses artefacts, papers and portraits which illuminate the McGill 
years. The founding of the University Archives in 1962 made accessible many additional items of information. 
Ben@ttingfrom these and other new sources, Dr. Frost has now written a biography, which is to be published by 
the McGill-Queen 's Press in the Spring of 1995. The last chapter has here been reworked to celebrate the 250th 
anniversary of James McGill's birth, 6 October, 1994. 
James McGill a curnulk plusieurs mandats dont celui de courageux nkgociunt en fourrures, deprosp2re commerrant 
nwntrkalais, de magistrat consciencieux, de membre influent de lJAssemblke lkgislative, de membre du Conseil 
dcutif du Gouvemeur et enfin de Colonel et de Brigadier-gknkral par intkrim de la Milice. Aussi remarquable 
quejkt sa personnalitk, son dkcks l'a 0-2s vite plongk dans l'oubli et de son souvenir ne persist2rent que les terres 
et les fonds qu'il avait lkguks pour la crkation d'un coll2ge. A la fin des annkes 1920, Maysie Steele MacSporran 
a Ccrit une th2se biographique sur James McGill mais comme celle-ci n'a jamais ktk publite, elle est passke 
pratiquement inaperpe. Duns les annkes 1980, S.B. Frost a consacrk le premier chapitre de son histoire de 
llUniversitk McGill ci son fondateur et John Cooper lui a consacrk un article complet duns le Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography. Parall2lement, Lawrence Lande rkunissait pour sa collection Canadiuna de prkcieux documents sur 
McGill et son kpoque, et la collection de livres rares de 1'Universitk faisait l'acquisition d'un certain nombre de 
documents financiers et de lettres lui ayant appartenu. Le Muske McCord posskde kgalement des artefacts, des 
documents et des portraits des annkes McGill. La crkation des archives de l1Universitk en 1962 a donnk acc2s ci 
plusieurs documents. Grdce a ces demiers et ci de nouvelles sources, S.B. Frost a rkdigk une biographie qui sera 
publike par les Presses universitaires McGill-Queen 's au printemps 1995. Le dernier chapitre qui est publik dans 
ces pages a ktk rkkcrit en vue de cklkbrer le 25C anniversaire de la naissance de James McGill, le 6 octobre 1994. 
or the Canadians of the early 19th century, and 
particularly for the merchants of Montreal, the 
War of 1812 was as unwelcome as it was 
unnecessary. The immediate causes were 
straight forward and can be quickly recalled. Great 
Britain was striving to administer the coup de grace in 
its long-standing war with France, and had instituted a 
continental blockade of Europe - which created yet 
another complication for Montreal's fur trade, but one 
that had to be endured stoically. The resulting 
interference with ocean commerce, however, 
profoundly irritated the Americans, because it hampered 
their growing international camer trade.' In enforcing 
the blockade the Royal Navy assumed the right to stop 
and search neutral ships for contraband, and in so doing 
infuriated American captains by also claiming that some 
of their seamen were British subjects (as indeed they 
often were) and therefore liable to 'impressment', that 
is, forcible enrolment in the British Navy. From the 
American point of view this was nothing other than 
sheer piracy, and must be resisted at all costs. A 
belligerent party formed in the Congress, and after 
much talk the United States finally declared war on 
Great Britain and its dependencies. But as the 
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Americans were not strong enough to challenge the 
Royal Navy at sea except in their own coastal waters, 
the only place where they could attack British 
possessions was on land, that is, along their own 
northern frontier. Consequently the Canadians suffered 
this 'War of 1812', even though it was none of their 
doing, or of their choosing. 
The longer term implications of the war were, 
however, deeply disturbing. Many Americans were by 
no means unhappy with the turn of events. They had 
not forgotten the more northerly frontier line they had 
attempted to secure in the 1783 negotiations which had 
ended the War of Independence, and still hankered for 
at least the southern peninsula of Upper Canada to 
become part of the Union. It had been largely settled 
by former Americans, including not only zealous 
United Empire Loyalists but also many others who had 
come north simply in search of free land and lower 
taxes. Many politicians in the United States persuaded 
themselves that these Upper Canadians would warmly 
welcome a liberating army of their former neighbours 
and fellow-citizens: President (1800-08) Thomas 
Jefferson himself had remarked that apart from the 
citadel of Quebec the capture of Canada was 'a mere 
matter of marching'. Others were more imperially 
motivated. Richard Johnson from Kentucky, for 
example, declared in Congress that 'the waters of the 
St. Lawrence and the Mississippi interlock in a number 
of places, and the Great Disposer of Human Events 
intended these two rivers should belong to the same 
people', and John Harper of New Hampshire also 
anticipated the 'Manifest Destiny' doctrine when he 
said: 'To me, sir, it appears that the Author of Nature 
has marked our limits in the south by the Gulf of 
Mexico, and on the north by the regions of eternal 
frost'. Even Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, wrote in 1813: 'It has ever been my 
opinion that if Canada is conquered it ought never to be 
surrendered if it can possibly be retained'.' There can 
be little doubt that if Canada had succumbed to the 
American attack, the provinces would have been 
forcibly and permanently incorporated into the Union. 
If Canada was fighting reluctantly, she was nevertheless 
fighting for her life. 
Because Upper Canada was the primary target, it 
was probable that the early activity in this war would 
take place on the Great Lakes and the Niagara 
Peninsula. The attack on the St. Lawrence Valley, if 
and when it came, would equally probably be made as 
before on the pivotal point of the line - the city of 
Montreal. So believed James McGill, and mentally and 
physically he was by no means unprepared for such an 
assault. 
By the year 1812 McGill had attained a position of 
primary responsibility in Montreal. For over thirty 
years a magistrate and twelve years a member of the 
Legislative Assembly, he was now the senior member 
of the Governor's Executive Council resident in the 
city, and therefore, in the absence of the Governor 
General and for lack of an elected mayor, he was de 
facto the head of civil authority. But he was also 
Colonel and Commanding Officer of the first battalion 
of the Montreal Militia. With the outbreak of war he 
was given two more militia companies and made 
commanding officer of the garrison of Montreal. 
Consequently, in this time of crisis, he was the head of 
both civil and military government in the city. 
He was particularly well-positioned to have a good 
grasp of the military situation. Potentially the 
Americans vastly outnumbered the Canadians, and 
McGill knew that Sir George Prevost, the new 
Governor General and Commander in Chief of British 
forces in North America, watching a frontier that 
stretched from Halifax to the Great Lakes, would have 
to husband his resources with extreme care. The 
maritime provinces would not be in any immediate 
danger, because of the protection of the Royal Navy 
and the great difficulties in the way of land access, but 
the Americans were counting on Britain being so 
preoccupied with the struggle against Napoleon that she 
would not have regular army units to spare for the 
Canadas. In fact, in 1812 Prevost had 10,000 regulars 
under his command, but McGill knew from his military 
sources that of these men, approximately 5,000 were in 
Nova Scotia, 4,000 in Lower Canada, but in the most 
threatened area, Upper Canada, not more than 1200. 
These last were under the command of Major General 
Isaac Brock, who was also the acting Administrator of 
the upper province. 
But from his trading contacts McGill was also well 
aware that there were allies eager to support the British 
effort. The Indians on the American western frontiers 
had been given the 'treaty' of Greenville in 1795, 
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which had drawn lines between American and Indian 
territories, south of Lake Erie. They were told that all 
lands south and east of the line were to be open to 
American settlement, but all those to the north and west 
were to belong to the Indians. But inevitably the 
pressure of continued white settlement quickly 
overflowed these boundaries and Indians led by the 
Shawnee brothers, Tecumseh and Temskwatawa, were 
anxious for war to break out between the Americans 
and Great Britain so that they could have British 
support in their attacks upon the hated American 
settlements. The Americans, of course, believed that 
these Indian attacks were not caused by their own 
relentless encroachment westward, but were the result 
of deliberate British encouragement. Where did the 
Indians obtain their muskets, their powder and shot, 
other than from British traders out of Montreal? 'Who 
does not know', asked Governor Harrison of the 
Indiana Territories,'that the tomahawk and the scalping 
knife of the savages are always employed as the 
instruments of British vengeance? At this moment.. . 
their agents are organizing a combination amongst the 
Indians within our limits for the purpose of 
assassination and murder'. 
There was considerable justice as well as rhetoric in 
these charges. Because the fur-trading partners of the 
North West Company, operating out of Montreal, were 
no more pleased with American settlement in the fur- 
bearing countries than were the Indians, they had 
readily sympathized with the natives and vigorously 
continued the Indian trade on which their fur supplies 
and the native way of life mutually depended. That 
commerce had always included weapons and 
ammunition, and continued to do so, so there was some 
justification for the American charges. But on the 
outbreak of war the Nor'westers went further: they not 
only urged Prevost to employ Indians against the 
American invaders but they offered the services of their 
ships and men on the St. Lawrence and the Great 
Lakes, and also to provide stores at what they termed 
'moderate prices' to the British Indian De~artment.~ 
These offers to McGill's great satisfaction were readily 
accepted. Since the incumbency of Governor General 
James Craig (1807-11) the administration had been 
quietly following a dual policy, one public and the other 
private. 'The salient features of both policies were to 
win the allegiance of the tribes by impressing upon 
them the wisdom of preserving a friendship with the 
British in the face of American westward expansion'.' 
The secret aspect of the policy was a generous flow of 
gifts and strong assurances of military support if war 
was declared. The British were not seeking a conflict 
but were determined to make full use of Indian allies if 
Canada were attacked, and the assistance of the fur 
traders was essential for the implementation of this 
policy. 
The Nor'westers were, of course, James McGill's 
former associates and continuing friends. Although by 
1810 he had himself largely retired from fur trading, 
and more recently from general trade, McGill continued 
to make good use of the merchants' information- 
network. He had been for some years alarmed by the 
increasing American talk of war. His sympathies were 
naturally with the fur traders, and the Upper Canadians, 
but his immediate concern was with the forces of law 
and security in his own city, Montreal. He had vivid 
memories of the American occupation of the city in 
1775 and he had no desire to repeat that experience. If 
there was again to be war with the Americans, his 
contribution to the defence of his country was to be in 
the preservation of civil peace and good order in the 
city, and in the organization and training of its garrison, 
the local militia. 
These militia units were the third and largest part of 
the forces under Prevost's command, and if some were 
ill-equipped and poorly trained, there were others who 
were in a reasonable state of preparedness. In 
particular Prevost had good reason to be grateful to the 
local leaders in Montreal. To fill the gap left by the 
extinction of the French colonial obligation laid upon 
rentiers for military service at the call of their 
seigneurs, the Governor's Council had introduced in 
1777 the first Canada Militia Act. By this ordinance, 
all males between the ages of 16 and 60 were liable for 
service in the militia of their parish. Failure to enrol 
invoked fines, and the withdrawal of privileges to keep 
firearms. Captains in each parish had to submit lists of 
militiamen, and to 'draw out' their companies on the 
last two Sundays of June and the first two in July, 'in 
order to inspect arms, fire at marks, and instruct them 
in their d ~ t i e s ' . ~  James McGill and other prominent 
merchants had given leadership in this matter for many 
years. In 1787 that old gossip Alexander Henry, who 
had been away from Montreal for some time, wrote to 
a friend: 'At my return here I found all our friends 
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Militia Mad, James McGill is a Major and Isaac Todd 
a Captain and so is old Dobie'? Because of his 
mercantile sources of information, McGill was aware 
more than most of what was afoot in the United States, 
and because of those memories of 1775 he and his 
friends knew they had good reason to be serious about 
the militia. Consequently, they welcomed the Governor 
General's initiative, and responded readily when in 
1790 he issued a call that all officers of the militia 
should urgently consider 'the proper means for putting 
the Militia under their Command in the most 
respectable Condition, that they may be able to defend 
themselves and the Province against all desultory or 
piratical attacks'. In 1794 James McGill was invited to 
address the Grand Jury empanelled at the Court of 
Quarter Sessions in Montreal and took the opportunity 
to dispel rumours that the militia would be sent abroad 
to fight wars in distant countries; but, he argued, to go 
to the assistance of their friends in Upper Canada, if 
they were attacked, would be only wise and prudent: 
is there among us any men, so weak and 
inconsiderate as to say, we can defend our 
country when an enemy shall have entered it and 
no sooner? Shall we of the town say that when 
the enemy is at the gates of Montreal it will then 
be time enough to resort to arms? Or will the 
inhabitants of a neighbouring parish refuse to 
assist those, who from local situation may be 
exposed to inroads from an enemy, until they 
themselves are attacked in their houses?' 
A bilingual manual was prepared entitled 'Rules and 
Regulations for the formation, exercise and movements 
of the Militia of Lower Canada', and while this 
compendium of military training was not publisheduntil 
May 1812, it shows the seriousness and thoroughness 
which had characterised militia training for many years. 
James McGill and his fellow officers, because of their 
long participation in the organization of the militia, 
were to prove an important part of Canada's resources 
when the war finally erupted. 
McGill had shown his strong support for the imperial 
government in other and more direct ways. France 
declared war on Britain in 1793 and a year later, he 
was chairman of the Montreal Association, the purpose 
of which was to support British rule in Canada. In 
1799 he joined a committee to receive and remit 
voluntary subscriptions to aid Britain in the prosecution 
of the war in E ~ r o p e . ~  The peace of 1801-3 brought 
some temporary respite, but with renewal of the conflict 
the news of Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar in 1805 
was good news indeed: for Canada, Britain's command 
of the oceans was essential. The relieved and grateful 
merchants of Montreal raised in 1809 a monument to 
the fallen hero at the top of Jacques Cartier Square, a 
few yards from McGill's home, and he was a generous 
contributor. 
But if Britain ruled the seas, the land war was by no , 
means won, and the irritation to the Americans was if 
anything only increased. It was rather ironic that 
President Madison should sign in Philadelphia the 
declaration of war against Great Britain on the 18th of 
June, 1812, when Lord Castlereagh the new British 
foreign secretary had announced only two days earlier 
in London that the offending naval 'stop and search' 
Orders in Council were to be revoked. But the two 
men were thousands of miles apart, and were ignorant 
of each other's actions; it would be weeks and months 
before the news of either decision reached the ships on 
the high seas and the more distant frontiers.1° In Lower 
Canada, James McGill, alerted by his private sources, 
was the first to receive and send to the Governor 
General reliable information that the Provinces were at 
war. His letter was dated 24 June, 8 a.m. and was 
brief: 
May it please your Excellency 
I have just been informed by Mr. Richardson that 
he has learnt by an Express from Albany that war 
has been declared against Great Britain by the 
American States, and as an Express is going from 
this [city] to Quebec I hold it to be my duty to 
give you this Information. 
I shall immediately call a meeting of the 
Executive Councillors . . . 
McGill signed himself 'Chairman of a Committee of 
the Executive Council', and it is clear that he was 
acting in accordance with earlier planning. The 
immediate tasks were to mobilize the militia, to decide 
what to do about United States citizens who were 
currently present in Montreal, whether immediately to 
impose martial law, and finally what to do about 
trading relations with the enemy. McGill's 
correspondence over the next few days and weeks 
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reveal him and his colleagues grappling with the 
practicalities of the situation. His fellow councillors in 
these anxious days were old collaborators in public 
affairs, Chief Justice James Monk and Judge Pierre 
Louis Panet, and it is obvious that there was unanimity 
among them; all three were well known as strong 
supporters of the Crown. The order for mobilisation of 
the militia was straightway promulgated in the city, and 
dispatched to the captains of units in the surrounding 
parishes. Proclamations were also posted that all 
American citizens must depart the city within a week 
'on pain of arrest'. It was decided that for the present 
it was not necessary to proclaim martial law. When a 
few weeks later, it was decided that this step had 
become prudent, the Committee nevertheless 
recommended that the civil courts should continue until 
further notice to deal with cases of a purely civil 
nature. 
The question of trade was a more difficult matter. 
An embargo was placed on the export of articles likely 
to be of use to the enemy forces, such as a m ,  
ammunition, horse harnesses, blankets, woollens and 
scalping knives; and a customs check-point was 
established at the half-way house on the road between 
La Prairie and St. John on the Richelieu River to 
enforce these regulations. But merchant that he was, 
McGill saw no reason for Americans who wanted to 
continue honest commerce with Canada to be prevented 
from doing so, especially those bringing in food 
supplies or valuable export commodities such as lumber 
or potash. Trade of this kind was to be allowed, but 
regulated by the granting of licences. Also, the 
petitions of those Americans who asked to be permitted 
to continue their residence in Montreal were to be 
scrutinized leniently: 'in all doubtful cases', McGill 
reported to Prevost, 'we are inclined to Indulgence 
rather than Rigour, being of opinion that such are the 
Intentions of the Governor in Chief. They were 
further encouraged in this practice, McGill remarks, 
because, if newspaper reports were to be believed, the 
United States authorities were behaving with reciprocal 
'indulgence'. 
The fact was that enthusiasm for this war was not 
widespread among the general American population, 
especially in those States which normally traded freely 
with the Canadas. Many Vermont and New York 
farmers saw lucrative opportunities in the need of the 
British forces to be supplied with grain and cattle. A 
clerk in the Army commissariat was assigned 
particularly to oversee the busy trade in beef from 
Vermont; at Ogdensburg, New York, a constant flow 
of supplies, mostly cattle and sheep, moved across the 
St. Lawrence to Fort Wellington. When the American 
commander stationed at Ogdensburg raided Gananoque 
across the river, and provoked a retaliatory raid by 
'Red Gwrge' Macdonell and the Glengarry Light 
Infantry, compelling the American forces to retreat to 
Sackets Harbor, the citizens of Ogdensburg petitioned 
that their troops should not return - military activities 
were obviously not good for business.'' However, once 
war had been declared, raids, skirmishes, even set 
battles could take place; men could be killed, homes 
could be burned, farms destroyed, women and children 
massacred. All these tragedies did indeed take place. 
Nevertheless, one of the decisions McGill found less 
difficult concerned the trader named Robert Dickson. 
He was probably the most influential trader amongst the 
western Indians of the upper Mississippi region." In 
the past, McGill had been one of his chief suppliers, 
and indeed had encountered much difficulty in 
collecting payments from him. Recently Dickson had 
been busy on his own initiative distributing presents 
among the Indians, in the name of their Great Father, 
the King of England, in order to consolidate their 
allegiance. Now he was putting in a claim to the Army 
paymaster for reimbursement. This was clearly a 
military matter, and was referred as a matter of course 
to General de Rottenburg, who in mid-July had been 
assigned over-all command of the Montreal district. 
But Dickson's activities had been, at least ostensibly, in 
accord with the fur trade's normal patterns and 
Rottenburg had been instructed to consult on all 
commercial matters with McGill. McGill had, in fact, 
already written to Prevost the previous month, urging 
the full use of the traders' services. It is not surprising 
then that it was decided that Dickson's services were of 
'enormous value' and that he should be both reimbursed 
and strongly encouraged in his activities. 
McGill's greatest concern, however, continued to be 
the preparation of the Montreal militia. MacSporran 
has transcribed his military correspondence for the 
years 1812-1813; the letters show that he worked 
continuously to keep his forces officered, disciplined 
and equipped. Shortly before the declaration of war, de 
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Rottenburg, at that time also acting Administrator of 
Lower Canada, ordered the militia officers of the 
province to consider the best means of mobilizing the 
contingents. In Montreal, McGill was chairman of the 
officers' conference and was responsible for drafting its 
report. On 14 June he presented a scheme for dividing 
the men on the parish rolls into four groups by age: 
16-18, 18-30, 30-40, 40-60. For the present, drill for 
six hours weekly should at once be arranged for the 
second and third groups, and the men readied to march 
at short notice; these would be the 'embodied' militia. 
The other two groups could remain in reserve, and 
form the 'sedentary' militia. Arms should be stored in 
each parish, possibly in the presbyteries - a central, 
recognized location, yet not profaning the sanctuaries 
themselves. 
As soon as the American declaration of war became 
known, McGill sought, in accordance with this 
planning, to assemble the 'embodied' militia, more 
closely defined as the unmarried men, aged 18-25. 
They were to be enrolled for ninety days, or in the 
event of armed invasion for one year. Their companies 
would be attached to and work with the regular forces, 
but militia men were not to be forced to enrol in 
regular British army units. The Legislative Assembly 
of Lower Canada had enacted these terms in February, 
1812, so McGill had full authority for his call to arms. 
Mobilivltion went smoothly enough, he reported to the 
Governor General, except for resistance 'by a great 
number of the Inhabitants of this Island from the West 
End of the Parish of Lachine up to the End [of the 
Island].' Fifty nine men were called from the area, of 
whom only twenty eight responded by crossing over to 
Laprairie, where the troops were being assembled, and 
of these, four later changed their minds and returned 
home. In a report dated 1 July, McGill reported these 
matters to the Governor General and added that the 
revolt had spread to 'St. Genevsve behind Pointe 
Claire', where 'One of the unlawful assembly declared 
that they [were] determined upon and prepared for Civil 
War'. The Committee decided that the situation called 
for prompt action. A force was assembled for despatch 
the next morning. It consisted of 100 regulars, 200 
militia and a detachment of artillery with two field 
guns. Clearly, McGill was taking no chances. Under 
the command of Captain John Richardson, 'about 350 
men marched this morning before 7 o'clock consisting 
of English and Canadians nearly equal in number9. 
The report of this incident was signed by James 
McGill, James Monk and Pierre Louis Panet, but 
MacSporran notes that the document is in McGill's 
handwriting. Evidently the language is also his own, 
and we notice its strong terms: those who oppose the 
constituted authorities are 'mad people' and are 
animated by a 'Spirit of disobedience and outrage'. 
McGill learns 'with astonishment' that they had 
confronted the King's troops. In response he was not 
prepared to be lenient or to appear indecisive. This 
was a war situation, with an enemy attack imminent. 
However, he was able to finish his report on a more 
positive note: 
In communicating this unpleasant occurrence, we 
have much satisfaction in being able to assure 
your Excellency that the Militia went off [this 
morning] with great cheerfulness, and that from 
every Report we obtain there is Reason to believe 
that, except in the Parishes of Pointe Claire, Ste. 
Genevikve, and Ste. Anne, the greatest zeal 
prevails, and we are of opinion that the prompt 
measures which have been accepted, will put a 
stop to further  disturbance^.'^ 
James McGill seems to have gauged the situation 
rightly,15 for three months later Alexander Henry wrote 
from Montreal to his friend John Askin, who lived in 
Sandwich, Upper Canada, in a most cheerful vein: 
We are all soldiers here - I expect preferment 
[before] the Battle, being the oldest captain in the 
British Militia. The Americans on the opposite 
side of the river are continually attacking our 
Boats going up to Kingston, I think it is their 
intention (if they can) to stop the communication, 
which they will find a difficult matter to perform. 
We have near ten thousand men in arms here and 
can with ease raise twenty thousand more, in ten 
days in case they come over our lines - but we 
do not intend attacking them on their side - I 
hope the Cold weather will disperse them for the 
Winter, and before the Spring they may have a 
change in their Government, which will produce 
a peace.. . 
Henry also mentioned that McGill's partner, Isaac 
Todd, was in the city and intending to stay the winter, 
so there was obviously no atmosphere of panic: 'we 
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are hourly expecting Gem. Dearboon [sic] with about 
Ten thousand of his troops to attack us, but we are not 
afeared of them, as our Canadians are in high Spirits'.16 
One reason for the general mood of optimism at the 
time Henry was writing was the unusual event which 
had recently taken place in the city. Following General 
Brock's successful assault on Detroit, the American 
general William Hull and his army had surrendered and 
had been sent to Montreal as prisoners of war. This 
victory greatly boosted Canadian morale generally, and 
the carefully staged pageantry with which the 
Americans were received worked wonders for the local 
population. The Montreal Herald (for the city now had 
three newspapers17) gave a lively description of the 
reception given to the captured general and his troops: 
Montreal, September 12th. [18 121 
... General Hull and suite, accompanied by about 
twenty-five officers and three hundred and fifty 
solders, left Kingston under an escort of 130 
men... At Lachine Captains Richardson and 
Ogilvie, with their companies of Montreal militia 
and a company of the King's [Regiment] 
commanded by Captain Blackmore, formed the 
escort till they were met by Colonel Auldjo with 
the remainder of the flank companies of the 
militia, upon which Captain Blackmore's 
Company fell out . . . leaving the prisoners to be 
guarded [as they marched through the illuminated 
streets] by the Montreal militia alone.. . IS 
This initial success was indeed heartening, but it was 
only that - an initial success. Everyone in Montreal 
knew that this was not going to be the end of the war 
and that probably hard fighting lay ahead. Largely 
owing to the bravery of Tecumseh and his warriors, the 
Upper Canadians won another important but costly 
victory in the battle of Queenston Heights on 13 
October, 1812; they suffered many casualties and lost 
their outstanding leader, General Isaac Brock. But the 
enemy suffered even greater losses and was forced to 
retreat across the river to their own side of the frontier. 
So the first attack on Upper Canada failed, but for the 
next twelve months American attacks and Canadian 
repulses continued. York (Toronto) was burned, but 
the invaders were cleared from the Niagara peninsula; 
the British lost an important naval engagement in Put- 
in-Bay on Lake Erie, and the Upper Canadians were 
defeated in an engagement at Moraviantown on the 
banks of the Thames River. But the Americans could 
not capitalize on their successes because their troops 
wanted to return home in time for the harvest. 
Altogether, from one summer to the next, 1812-13 
was an indecisive year, but from Montreal's point of 
view, it was an opportunity for de Rottenburg and his 
regulars, and McGill and his militia, to prepare 
themselves even more thoroughly for the impending 
assault upon the city. It was a matter of considerable 
satisfaction to McGill at this anxious time that the 
defenders of the city were truly representative of the 
whole population, both Canadien and British. There 
were regiments like the Canadian Fencibles which were 
mainly English speaking and others Pike the Voltigueurs 
mostly French-speaking, and there were the embodied 
and sedentary militia units drawn from both 
communities, and officered by Canadien or British 
citizens without distinction. McGill could echo Henry 
with femour: 'We are all soldiers here'. 
The Americans did not begin their approach to the 
city until the fall of 1813. Their plan was to employ a 
two-fold strategy. General Wade Hampton would 
follow the Lake Champlain-Richelieu route and attack 
from the south, and General James Wilkinson would 
advance down the St. Lawrence to attack the city from 
the west. Fortunately for the Canadians, the two 
commanders were mutually jealous and each suspected 
that in the event of failure the other would attempt to 
make him the scapegoat. The two invading forces, 
their every move reported by Indian scouts, slowly and 
cautiously manoeuvred into position. Hampton, making 
his way north following the Richelieu river, crossed 
into Canada as far as LaColle, but then changed his 
mind, retreated to Chazy and started out again by way 
of Four Comers, and from there proceeded down the 
Chateauguay River. He finally reached Chateauguay 
itself to the southwest of Montreal on 25 October. 
Wilkinson was even more tardy. His army and its 
boats had not left Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario until 
13 October, and he was still making his way down the 
St. Lawrence, the northern bank of which remained in 
Canadian hands. 
Montreal readied itself to resist the attack. There 
would be no bloodless surrender as in 1775. Church 
bells were rung, and beacons lighted to spread the news 
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of the impending danger; all sedentary militia were to 
report to their captains, even if only armed with axes 
and spades. James McGill was raised to the acting rank 
of Brigadier General and given command of all the 
militia forces of the city, a striking confirmation of the 
respect he had won from de Rottenburg and Sir George 
Prevost. To borrow Milton's phrase, he was now in 
Montreal 'our Chief of Men'. 
When news reached Montreal that Wilkinson's boats 
had successfully passed Prescott, Lt. Colonel Hercules 
Scott and the 103rd regiment of regulars were sent with 
Indian support from Caughnawaga (Kahnawake) to 
strengthen Lt. Colonel Louis-Joseph Deschambault and 
the Beauharnois militia at Coteau du Lac, and regular 
troops under Major General de Watteville were sent to 
reinforce Lt. Colonel de Salaberry's militia companies 
at Chateauguay, facing Hampton's invasion. De 
Salaberry's other forces included two companies of his 
own Voltigueurs, a light company of the Canadian 
Fencibles, a company of militia from Boucherville and 
'a handful of Indians'. The speed and efficiency with 
which the militias moved into their positions were 
especially commendable. William Dunlop, who served 
as an Asst. Surgeon in the British 89th regiment, and 
later became a noted Canadian author, wrote in his 
Recollections: 'We came up with several regiments of 
militia on their line of march. They had all a 
serviceable, effective appearance - had been pretty 
well drilled, and their arms, being direct from the 
Tower [of London], were in perfectly good order.. .'I9 
Colonel Duguid, in his History of the Canadian 
Grenadier Guards, made a comparable comment: 'The 
obvious ease with which [militia] companies moved and 
acted in this campaign calls for explanation. There can 
be no doubt that this resulted from 15 months of 
consistent training.. . '" 
As Acting Brigadier General in command of 
Montreal's militia defence forces, McGill was kept 
closely informed on all this military planning, and was 
called upon to supply local knowledge of the city and 
its environs, as well as of the qualities of the various 
militia units and their leaders. Once de Rottenburg and 
his staff had formulated their plans, McGill passed 
many anxious days, keeping his men alert while waiting 
for news of the enemy's approach. He had the 
satisfaction of knowing that the morale of the 
population continued to be very high. 
For the men of the Chateauguay and Boucherville 
miltias, their day of testing was to be 26 October, 
1813. That was when Hampton finally mounted his 
attack on their positions on the banks of the 
Chateauguay River. The Canadiens were happy to be 
commanded by one of their own, Charles-Michel de 
Salaberry, who made expert use of his familiarity with 
the terrain. He had chosen and prepared his ground 
with great care, and his main lines stood firm behind 
hidden wooden barricades, and stoutly repelled the 
American attack. The skilful deployment of flanking 
militia, to harass the enemy's advance, their expertise 
in woods-warfare, and de Salaberry's example of 
personal bravery - he stood exposed on a tree-stump, 
so that he might be seen by all, encouraging his men - 
were further major advantages favouring the Canadians. 
Hampton, mired in the swamp into which he had been 
decoyed, was unable to maintain his communications. 
In mud and forest the Americans suffered considerable 
losses and were forced to retreat, first to Four Corners, 
and from there to Plattsburg. It has been reliably 
reported that on the Canadian side only some 350 men 
were actively engaged in this battle which stopped the 
march of Hampton's 5,000 regulars, but the forward 
units were supported in depth by many times their own 
number, had they been needed. Nevertheless, the 
victory was truly a Canadian rather than a British 
achievement. It was warmly celebrated in Montreal 
and by none more unreservedly than James McGill. 
But three weeks later, Wilkinson was still coming 
down the St. Lawrence. To better negotiate the Long 
Sault rapids, he crossed to the Canadian bank of the 
river. He was pursued and attacked by British and 
Canadian forces at Crysler's Farm near Morrisburg. 
His rearguard was so severely mauled that his main 
army had to move hastily down river to Cornwall. 
Fearing further costly attacks, the Americans decided to 
recross the river, and regroup on their own side at Fort 
Covington on the Salmon River. Here they learned of 
Hampton's withdrawal to Plattsburg, and this was 
enough to persuade them to abandon any further plans 
for the attack on Montreal. The excellent coordination 
of efforts in Lower and Upper Canada had proved 
effective. As George Stanley commented: 'What gave 
Crysler's Farm the appearance of a decisive battle was 
Hampton's inability to brush de Salaberry's militia aside 
at Chateaug~ay'.~' The grand assault on the central 
pivot of the long St Lawrence valley had been defeated 
before it could be properly mounted. 
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When the early rumours were confirmed that 
Hampton was back in Plattsburg and Wilkinson in Fort 
Covington, Montreal could relax. For this city, the 
'War of 1812' was as good as over. Reverting to his 
substantive rank, Colonel James McGill received a 
signal from de Rottenburg to stand his militia down and 
to send his well-deserving patriots back to their homes. 
He and his men could look back with great satisfaction 
on a job well done; he himself could rest assured he 
had discharged in full his responsibility for his beloved 
city. He gave the order for demobilization on 20th 
November. Four weeks later he fell sick and after a 
short illness died on the nineteenth day of December, 
1813. 
The fallen leader was escorted to his resting-place by 
an honour guard of his own militia, and despite 
inclement weather the cortege was followed 'by an 
immense concourse of citizens of all classes'. The 
Gazette published his obituary recalling his many 
services to city and province, and a handsome 
monument was erected over his grave. Yet within a 
few years his achievements and even his name were 
almost wholly forgotten: McGill Street was only one 
more place name among many. He was not alone in 
this. The Frobishers, William McGillivray, Alexander 
Henry, Simon McTavish (who clung for a while to 
remembrance as a ghostly legend), Alexander 
McKenzie, McGill's partner, Isaac Todd, are even now 
known only to the few as anything more than vague 
names. 
That perhaps is not altogether surprising. The early 
fur traders as a group contributed little to the Montreal 
community; they either fared poorly and died in 
obscurity, or made their money and like Alexander 
McKenzie departed - in his case to Scotland to 
become a laird. A visitor to Montreal in the late 1830s 
remarked that 'those who made their fortunes in the fur 
trade have nearly, if not all, passed away from the 
theatre of action, and their money seems to have 
vanished with them'.22 But James McGill was 
different. During his lifetime he gave richly by 
personal service to his city and province, and when he 
died he left his large fortune, including one very 
generous bequest to education, within the city he had 
chosen as his own. The only other fur trader to make 
a comparable contribution was John Richardson, the 
father of Canadian banking and the moving spirit in the 
founding of the Montreal General Hospital. But he was 
of a younger generation, he had McGill's example to 
inspire him, and he aroused as much antagonism as 
support for his efforts by his frankly partisan attitudes: 
he constantly urged les canudiens to 'become British'. 
One can understand why not everyone wanted to 
perpetuate his memory. McGill on the other hand had 
always a great respect for his francophone colleagues 
and neighbours. He spoke their language, married into 
one of their prominent families, shared many of 
Governor General Carleton's tolerant attitudes, was 
generous in his will to French Catholics and English 
Protestants alike, and left by far the greater part of his 
fortune to his Canadien heirs. 
Ironically, it was this last generosity which 
contributed most to his speedy historical demise. The 
Desrivibes family not only inherited the bulk of his 
fortune but they also inherited his personal possessions 
- his furniture, books and papers. But they contested 
the educational bequest, and for over twenty years 
conducted a bitter legal battle which took the supporters 
of McGill College through the law courts right up to 
the Privy Council in England, not once but twice. It 
was 1835 before the Desrivikres handed over the last of 
the College endowment. Mrs. McGill and her two sons 
had long died, and in the animosity of the legal battle 
with the anglophone community, any kindly feelings 
remaining in the rest of the family for their Scottish 
Protestant benefactor had long since evaporated. The 
name McGill was not perpetuated in family baptisms 
after 1832. Within another generation the family had 
moved out to East Stansted and built the chateau 
Malmaison on the extensive lands they had inherited; 
later generations moved into pebec  City and became 
a much respected family of lawyers and bureaucrats. 
What McGill furniture, books and papers still remained 
were dispersed by the move, and all recollection of 
James McGill was effectively lost to the family 
memory. " 
Similarly, in anglophone Montreal, there were no 
close friends left after McGill's passing to keep his 
memory green. None of the three McGill brothers had 
any children and James, although the eldest, outlived all 
his own generation. Had his adopted daughter, 
Charlotte Porteous, not died of consumption a year 
before his own passing, we might well have had a 
source of kindly reminiscence. Isaac Todd retired to 
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Bath, England, and left no written memoirs - he had 
no legitimate offspring and his nephew Andrew Todd 
had predeceased him. Those who contended for the 
College - Archdeacon G. J. Mountain, lawyer Stephen 
Sewell, physician John Stephenson - had no personal 
memories of the man who had made their fight 
possible. So as a personality James McGill quickly 
passed out of memory; he remained only as a name. 
But as we have seen in this account of his role in the 
War of 1812, he was in his day a man of great 
importance in the affairs of his chosen city, and the 
story of his life, as fully as it can now be recovered, is 
an essential part of an extremely important period in 
Canadian history. If no one else remembers, we who 
are the richest inheritors of his foresight, patriotism and 
beneficence should recall with gratitude the 
achievements of this good, effective and generous man, 
and take great pride in our first benefactor and only 
founder, James McGill. 
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